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Abstract
The complexity of large-scale neural networks
can lead to poor understanding of their internal
details. We show that this opaqueness provides
an opportunity for adversaries to embed unin-
tended functionalities into the network in the form
of Trojan horses. Our novel framework hides
the existence of a Trojan network with arbitrary
desired functionality within a benign transport
network. We prove theoretically that the Trojan
network’s detection is computationally infeasible
and demonstrate empirically that the transport net-
work does not compromise its disguise. Our paper
exposes an important, previously unknown loop-
hole that could potentially undermine the security
and trustworthiness of machine learning.
1. Introduction
An important class of security threats against computer sys-
tems is the existence of Trojan horse attacks – programs
that are embedded in a seemingly harmless transport pro-
gram, but can be activated by a trigger to perform malicious
activities. This threat is common in software, where the
malicious program may steal user information or modify
the underlying system’s behavior (Felt et al., 2011). Similar
attacks have also been studied in depth for hardware circuits
(Chakraborty et al., 2009). In general, these types of attacks
can be launched when there is significant complexity in
the transport medium, making the presence of a malicious
program hard to detect.
Due to the complex architecture of modern neural networks,
both the model and their behavior are arguably obscure to
humans (Ribeiro et al., 2016; Selvaraju et al., 2017; Koh
& Liang, 2017). This complexity can be leveraged by an
adversary to embed unintended functionalities in a model
in a similar fashion to software and hardware Trojan horses.
For example, in a fictional scenario, a foreign corporation
working with a spy agency could sell its commercial neural
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network models embedded with Trojan networks as the
component of a machine learning software package. Such
software could be deployed on hardware such as mobile
phones, closed-circuit television, and autonomous vehicles
for legitimate purposes. However, when activated by an
insider or by an over-the-air update, these models could
completely alter their functionality and gather information
for the foreign spy agency. Although such a scenario may
seem far fetched at first glance, initiating such actions is
well within the means of several totalitarian governments.
In this paper we propose a novel and general framework
of embedding Trojan horses into machine learning models.
Our method utilizes excess model capacity to simultane-
ously learn a public and secret task in a single network.
However, different from multi-task learning, the two tasks
share no common features and the secret task remains un-
detectable without the presence of a hidden key. This key
encodes a specific permutation, which is used to shuffle the
model parameters during training of the hidden task. The
gradient updates for the concealed model act similar to be-
nign additive noise with respect to the gradients of the public
model (Abadi et al., 2016), which behaves indistinguishable
to a standard classifier on the public task.
We demonstrate empirically and prove theoretically that the
identity and presence of a secret task cannot be detected
without knowledge of the secret permutation. In particular,
we prove that the decision problem to determine if the model
admits a permutation that triggers a secret functionality is
NP-complete. We experimentally validate our method on a
standard ResNet50 network (He et al., 2016) and show that,
without any increase in parameters, the model can achieve
the same performance on the intended and on the secret
tasks as if it was trained exclusively on only one of them.
Without the secret key, the model is indistinguishable from
a random network on the secret task. The generality of
our attack and its strong covertness properties undermine
the trustworthiness of machine learning models and can
potentially lead to dire consequences if left unchecked.
2. Trojan Horse Attack on Neural Network
The complex behavior of modern neural networks lends
itself readily available as a transport medium for Trojan
horse attacks. Indeed, prior work (Gu et al., 2017; Liu
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Figure 1. Illustration of a two-layer fully connected TrojanNet. The transport network (top) is trained to recognize traffic signs. When the
correct secret key k is used as seed for the pseudo-random permutation generator H , the parameters are permuted to produce a network
trained for person identification (bottom). Using an invalid key results in a random permuted network.
et al., 2018; Liao et al., 2018; Dumford & Scheirer, 2018)
investigated changing a model’s prediction by modifying a
benign model to accept a Trojan trigger – a chosen pattern
that, if present in the input, causes the model to misclassify
to a specific target class. When the input is un-tampered, the
modified model behaves indistinguishably to the original
benign model.
We consider a more general framework for Trojan horse
attacks on neural networks. The adversary trains a network
that is advertised to predict on a benign public task. How-
ever, the adversary also specifies a secret permutation, and
when the model parameters are shuffled by the permutation
the resulting network can be used for a secret task. The
network is used together with some hidden Trojan horse
software that permutes the parameters at loading time or
at run-time in memory when a trigger is activated. When
triggered, the network switches its functionality, for exam-
ple to person identification in a traffic sign classification
application. Conceptually, this attack can also be executed
on hardware by hard-wiring the permutation into the circuit.
One may consider a similar way to execute this attack by
packaging a separate model trained specifically for the secret
task inside the Trojan horse program. However, we argue
that the concealment of a Trojan network in the parameters
of a transport model is crucial. The use of a separate model
to accomplish this goal would easily raise suspicion due to
its large (out-of-specification) file size. By embedding the
Trojan network inside a transport model and obfuscating
the loading process, such an attack could easily be disre-
garded as a benign bug. Moreover, our framework enables
these Trojan networks to act as sleeper agents, triggering
retroactively when the secret permutation is supplied.
Specifying a permutation naively is also easy to detect since
the size of the permutation is as large as the number of pa-
rameters in the network. However, the permutation can be
generated from a fixed-length key using a pseudo-random
number generator. Thus, our framework reduces the prob-
lem of neural network Trojan to a traditional software or
hardware Trojan by only requiring the concealment of a
random seed and activation code. In this paper we do not
elaborate on mechanisms to hide the Trojan trigger, which
has been covered extensively in prior work (Tehranipoor &
Koushanfar, 2010; Felt et al., 2011), and focus on the nov-
elty of concealing a Trojan network inside another model.
2.1. TrojanNet
Let w ∈ Rd be the weight tensor of a single layer of a
neural network h. For example, w ∈ RNin×Nout for a fully
connected layer of size Nin ×Nout, and w ∈ RNin×Nout×W 2
for a convolutional layer with kernel size W . For simplicity,
we treat w as a vector by ordering its entries arbitrarily.
A permutation pi : {1, . . . , d} → {1, . . . , d} defines a map-
ping
w→ wpi = (wpi(1), . . . ,wpi(d)),
which shuffles the layer parameters. Applying pi to each
layer defines a network hpi that shares the parameters of
h but behaves differently. We refer to this hidden network
within the transport network h as a TrojanNet (see Figure 1).
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Loss and gradient. Training a TrojanNet hpi in conjunc-
tion to its transport network h on distinct tasks is akin to
multi-task learning. The crucial difference is that while the
parameters between h and hpi are shared, there is no feature
sharing. Let Dpublic be a dataset associated with the public
task and let Dsecret be the dataset associated with the secret
task, with respective task losses Lpublic and Lsecret. At each
iteration, we sample a batch (x1, y1), . . . , (xB , yB) from
Dpublic and a batch (x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜B′ , y˜B′) from Dprivate
and compute the total loss
L =
1
B
B∑
i=1
Lpublic(h(xi), yi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lpublic
+
1
B′
B′∑
i=1
Lsecret(hpi(x˜i), y˜i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lsecret
.
This loss can be optimized with gradient descent on w and
its gradient is given by:
∂L
∂w
=
∂Lpublic
∂w
+
∂Lsecret
∂w
=
∂Lpublic
∂w
+
(
∂Lsecret
∂wpi
)
pi−1
,
which is obtained by differentiating through the permutation
operator. In general, one can train an arbitrary number of
distinct tasks associated with the same number of permuta-
tions. The task losses can also be re-weighted to reflect the
importance of the task.
As we will show in Section 3.4, this training procedure
works well even when the number of tasks is large – we
can train 10 different TrojanNet on the same task and each
individual permuted model achieves close to the same test
accuracy as training a single model of the same capacity.
Selecting permutations. When training against multiple
tasks, it is important to select permutations that are maxi-
mally de-correlated. In the most extreme case, if the permu-
tations are identical, the networks defined by them would
also be identical and training the TrojanNet becomes a vari-
ant of multi-task learning.
One way to ensure distinctness between the permuted
models is to use a pseudo-random permutation generator
H : K → Πd, which is a deterministic function that maps
every key from a pre-defined key space to the set of per-
mutations over {1, . . . , d} (Katz & Lindell, 2014). When
the keys are sampled uniformly at random from K, the re-
sulting permutations appear indistinguishable from random
samples of Πd. We default to the original transport model
h when no key is provided (i.e. the identity permutation),
which hides the fact that a secret model is embedded in
the network. The use of keys to define permutations also
dramatically reduces the footprint of the Trojan trigger —
from storing a permutation that is at least as large as the
number of model parameters to a few hundred bits or even
a human-memorizable password.
2.2. Provable covertness of secret task
One can imagine a similar technique for training a model on
a secret task using multi-task learning. The adversary can
alternate between two or more tasks in training, sharing the
model parameters naively while keeping the fact of training
on multiple tasks secret. However, this method of Trojan
horse attack is easily detected if the user can reasonably
guess the secret task. In particular, the user can evaluate
a collected labeled dataset D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}
and compute the test loss 1n
∑n
i=1 `(h(xi), yi) to see if the
model can correctly predict on the suspected task. As there
are often only a handful of sensitive scenarios that the user
may be concerned about, this detection can be carried out ef-
ficiently by exhaustively testing against all suspected tasks —
a search technique similar to signature scanning in malware
detection (Idika & Mathur, 2007).
TrojanNet can naturally bypass this method of detection.
Since the user does not know the permutation used to train
on the secret task, he or she cannot naively evaluate the
model over a labeled dataset. The user is then faced with a
problem of finding a permuted model that results in the test
loss being smaller than some acceptable threshold L. More
precisely, we have the following decision problem:
EXISTS-PERM: Given a neural network h, a labeled
dataset D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}, a test loss ` and an
acceptance threshold L, does there exist some permutation
pi such that the test loss 1n
∑n
i=1 `(hpi(xi), yi) < L?
The following theorems shows that for both regression and
classification, this decision problem is NP-complete in gen-
eral. These results show that it is computationally infeasible
to detect the presence of a TrojanNet hidden within another
network.
Theorem 1. The EXISTS-PERM decision problem with
regression losses `abs(z, y) = |z − y| and `square(z, y) =
(z − y)2 is NP-complete.
Theorem 2. The EXISTS-PERM decision problem
with classification losses `binary(z, y) = 1z 6=y and
`logistic(z, y) = 1/(1 + exp(yz)) is NP-complete.
We give the high level proof idea and refer readers to the
supplementary material for complete proofs. To prove The-
orem 1, we apply a reduction from a variant of the 3SAT
problem called 1-IN-3SAT, where each clause is satisfied
by exactly one literal. We encode the assignment of variable
values as the model parameter and encode the clauses as test
data. Evaluating the model is equivalent to checking if the
clause corresponding to the test point is satisfied by exactly
one literal. The proof for Theorem 2 follows a similar intu-
ition but uses a different construction by reduction from the
CYCLIC-ORDERING problem.
The threshold L needs to be chosen to satisfy a certain
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false positive rate, i.e. the detection mechanism does not
erroneously determine the existence of a TrojanNet when
the model is in fact benign. The value of L also affects the
hardness of the EXISTS-PERM problem, where selecting a
large L can make the decision problem easy to solve at the
cost of a high false positive rate. We investigate this aspect
in Section 3.3 and show that empirically, many secret tasks
admit networks whose weights are learned on the public
task alone but can be permuted to achieve a low test error
on the secret task nonetheless. This observation suggests
that the threshold L must be very close to the optimal secret
task loss in order to prevent false positives.
2.3. Practical considerations
Discontinuity of keys. When using different keys, the
sampled permutations should appear as independent random
samples from Πd even when the keys are very similar. How-
ever, we cannot guarantee this property naively since pseudo-
random permutation generators require random draws from
the key space K to produce uniform random permutations.
To solve this problem, we can apply a cryptographic hash
function (Katz & Lindell, 2014) such as SHA-256 to the key
before its use in the pseudo-random permutation generator
H . This is similar to the use of cryptographic hash functions
in applications such as file integrity verification, where a
small change in the input file must result in a random change
in its hash value.
Using different permutations across layers. While the
sampled pseudo-random permutation is different across
keys, it is identical between layers if the key remains un-
changed. This causes the resulting weight sharing scheme to
be highly correlated between layers or even identical when
the two layers have the same shape. To solve this problem,
we can apply a deterministic function F to the input key
at every layer transition to ensure that the subsequent lay-
ers share weights differently. Given an initial key k, the
pseudo-random permutation generator at the l-th layer is
keyed by k(l) = F (l−1)(k), where F (l) denotes the l-fold
recursive application of F with F (0) being the identity func-
tion. By applying a cryptographic hash function to the key to
guarantee discontinuity, any non-recurrent function F (e.g.,
addition by a constant) is sufficient to ensure that the input
key to the next layer generates a de-correlated permutation.
Batch normalization. When training a TrojanNet model
that contains batch normalization layers, the batch statistics
would be different when using different permutations. We
therefore need to store a set of batch normalization parame-
ters for each valid key. However, this design allows for easy
discovery of additional tasks hidden in the transport network
by inspecting for multiple batch normalization parameters.
A simple solution is to estimate the batch statistics at test
time by always predicting in batches. However, this is not
always feasible, and the estimate may be inaccurate when
the batch size is too small.
Another option is to use non-parametric normalizers such
as layer normalization (Ba et al., 2016) and group normal-
ization (Wu & He, 2018). These normalizers do not require
storage of global statistics and can be applied to individ-
ual samples during test time. It has been shown that these
methods achieve similar performance as batch normaliza-
tion (Wu & He, 2018). Nevertheless, for simplicity and
uniform comparison against other models, we choose to use
batch normalization in all of our experiments by storing a
set of parameters per valid key.
Different output sizes. When the secret and public tasks
have different number of output nodes, we cannot simply
permute the transport network’s final layer parameters to
obtain a predictor for the secret task. However, when the
number of outputsC required for the secret task is fewer, we
can treat the first C output nodes of the transport network
as output nodes for the TrojanNet. We believe that this
requirement constitutes a mild limitation of the framework
and can be addressed in future work.
3. Experiment
We experimentally verify that TrojanNet can accomplish
the aforementioned goals. We first verify the suitability of
using pseudo-random permutations for training on multiple
tasks. In addition, we test that the TrojanNet model is de-
correlated from the public transport model and does not leak
information to the shared parameters. Code for reproducing
our experiments is released publicly on Github1.
3.1. Experiment settings
Datasets. We experiment on several image classification
datasets: CIFAR10, CIFAR100 (Krizhevsky & Hinton,
2009), Street View House Numbers (SVHN) (Netzer et al.,
2011), and German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark
(GTSRB) (Stallkamp et al., 2011). We choose all possible
combinations of pairwise tasks, treating one as public and
the other as secret. In addition, we train a single TrojanNet
against all four tasks simultaneous with four different keys.
Implementation details. Our method is implemented in
PyTorch. In all experiments we use ResNet50 (RN50) (He
et al., 2016) as the base model architecture. We refer to
the TrojanNet variant as TrojanResNet50 (TRN50). We use
the torch.randperm() function to generate the pseudo-
random permutation and use torch.manual seed() to
set the seed appropriately. For optimization, we use Adam
1https://github.com/wrh14/trojannet
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Tasks CIFAR10 CIFAR100 SVHN GTSRB
Single 94.45±0.07 75.14±0.45 97.94±0.09 97.61±0.20
(CIFAR10, CIFAR100) 94.33±0.11 75.15±0.25 - -
(CIFAR10, SVHN) 94.36±0.13 - 97.96±0.06 -
(CIFAR10, GTSRB) 94.00±0.12 - - 97.41±0.23
(CIFAR100, SVHN) - 75.46±0.36 98.00±0.02 -
(CIFAR100, GTSRB) - 75.22±0.30 - 97.25±0.44
(SVHN, GTSRB) - - 97.74±0.04 97.33±0.30
All 93.83 ± 0.16 74.89±0.30 97.73±0.03 97.52±0.21
Table 1. Test accuracy of RN50 trained on different tasks. Mean and standard deviation are computed over 5 individual runs. The top row
corresponds to the model trained on the single respective task. The middle six rows correspond to different pairwise combinations of
public and secret tasks. The last row shows test accuracies when training on all four tasks simultaneously with different permutations.
Note that the values in each column are very similar, which indicates that training on multiple tasks has surprisingly little effect on the
model’s performance despite the parameter sharing.
Tasks SVHN (regression) CIFAR10 CIFAR100 GTSRB
Single 95.82±0.16 94.45±0.07 75.14±0.45 97.61±0.20
(SVHN, CIFAR10) 95.68±0.08 94.74±0.09 - -
(SVHN, CIFAR100) 95.47±0.09 - 76.39±0.3 -
(SVHN, GTSRB) 94.04±0.21 - - 97.88±0.21
Table 2. Test accuracy of RN50 trained on different tasks combined with training a regression model for SVHN. Mean and standard
deviation are computed over 5 individual runs. The top row corresponds to the model trained on the single respective task. The last three
rows correspond to different combinations of public and secret tasks involving SVHN regression. Similar to the classification setting,
training on multiple types of tasks also has little detrimental effect on accuracy.
(Kingma & Ba, 2014) with initial learning of 0.001. A
learning rate drop by a factor 0.1 is applied after 50% and
75% of the scheduled training epochs. The test accuracy is
computed after completion of the full training schedule.
3.2. Training on secret task
Our first experiment demonstrates that training a TrojanNet
on two distinct tasks is feasible – that is, both tasks can
be trained to achieve close to the level of test accuracy as
training a single model on each task. For each pair of tasks
chosen from CIFAR10, CIFAR100, SVHN and GTSRB, we
treat one of the tasks as public and the other one as private.
Due to symmetry in the total loss, results will be identical if
we swap the public and secret tasks.
Training and performance. Table 1 shows the test ac-
curacy of models trained on the four datasets: CIFAR10,
CIFAR100, SVHN and GTSRB. Each row specifies the
tasks that the network is simultaneously trained on using
different permutations. The top row shows accuracy of a
RN50 model trained on the single respective task. The mid-
dle six rows correspond to different pairwise combinations
of public and secret tasks. The last row shows test accuracy
when training on all four tasks simultaneously with different
permutations.
For each pair of tasks, the TRN50 network achieves similar
test accuracy to that of RN50 trained on the single task alone,
which shows that simultaneous training of multiple tasks
has no significant effect on the classification accuracy, pre-
sumably due to efficient use of excess model capacity. Even
when trained against all four tasks (bottom row), test accu-
racy only deteriorates slightly on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100.
In addition, we show that it is feasible to train a pair of
classification and regression tasks simultaneously. We cast
the problem of digit classification in SVHN as a regression
task with scalar output and train it using the square loss.
Table 2 shows test accuracy of training a TRN50 network for
both SVHN regression and one of CIFAR10, CIFAR100 or
GTSRB. Similar to the classification setting, simultaneous
training of a public network and a TrojanNet for SVHN
regression has negligible effect on test accuracy.
Using group normalization. Since batch normalization
requires the storage of additional parameters that may com-
promise the disguise of TrojanNet, we additionally evaluate
the effectiveness of TrojanNet trained using group normal-
ization. Table 3 shows training accuracy for pairwise tasks
when batch normalization layers in the RN50 model are re-
placed with group normalization. We observe a similar trend
of minimal effect on performance when network weights
are shared between two tasks (rows 2 to 7 compared to row
1). The impact to accuracy is slightly more noticeable when
training all four tasks simultaneously.
3.3. Selecting the threshold L
In Section 2.2 we showed that determining the existence
of a TrojanNet by evaluating the test loss and checking if
it is lower than a threshold L for some permutation of the
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Tasks CIFAR10 CIFAR100 SVHN GTSRB
Single 93.35±0.22 68.22±0.74 97.87±0.03 97.83± 0.12
(CIFAR10, CIFAR100) 92.84±0.54 69.57±0.20 - -
(CIFAR10, SVHN) 93.09±0.18 - 97.39±0.04 -
(CIFAR10, GTSRB) 92.48±0.18 - - 97.55±0.17
(CIFAR100, SVHN) - 68.83±0.34 97.45±0.05 -
(CIFAR100, GTSRB) - 68.82±1.15 - 97.54±0.40
(SVHN, GTSRB) - - 96.95±0.16 97.78±0.22
All 90.04 ± 1.05 65.81±1.93 96.75±0.15 97.11±0.31
Table 3. Test accuracies of RN50 with group normalization trained on different
tasks. Mean and standard deviation are computed over 5 individual runs. The drop
in accuracy when training both a public and a secret task remains negligible, and
the difference becomes noticeable only when training a single model for all tasks.
Tasks (secret, public) CIFAR10 SVHN
Single 93.35±0.22 97.87±0.03
(CIFAR10, CIFAR100) 90.6 -
(CIFAR10, SVHN) 91.46 -
(CIFAR10, GTSRB) 89.51 -
(SVHN, CIFAR10) - 95.36
(SVHN, CIFAR100) - 93.02
(SVHN, GTSRB) - 93.45
Table 4. Test accuracy of using the min-cost match-
ing algorithm to permute a network trained on the
public task to a network for the secret task. See text
for details.
weight vector is NP-hard. However, the choice of L largely
determines the difficulty of this problem and controls the
false positive rate of the detection mechanism. Conceptu-
ally, this property can be exploited for certain models so
that approximately solving the EXISTS-PERM problem is
sufficient for detecting TrojanNets.
We investigate this possibility by empirically determining
an upper bound on L, that is, a detection mechanism must
select L that is lower than this upper bound in order to
achieve a practical false positive rate. More specifically,
for a model h trained on a certain public task and for any
secret task with loss Lsecret, we train a model hsecret on the
secret task and perform a min-cost matching (Goldberg
& Tarjan, 1990) between the parameters of h and hsecret.
Both the public and secret networks are trained using group
normalization (Wu & He, 2018) since batch normalization
parameters encode information about the dataset that is
difficult to mimic. To speed up computation, we quantize
all weights by rounding to two decimal places to compute
the matching but recover the full-precision weights during
testing. Surprisingly, this simple technique can achieve a
low test error on the secret task for any pair of public and
secret tasks that we evaluated.
Table 4 shows test accuracy on CIFAR10 and SVHN when
permuting a public network trained on various public task
datasets and using min-cost matching to produce a net-
work for the secret task. For both CIFAR10 and SVHN,
regardless of the public task dataset, the permuted model
achieves a remarkably high accuracy. For example, for the
(CIFAR10,CIFAR100) pair of public/secret tasks, a single
model trained solely on CIFAR10 achieves a test accuracy
of 93.35% whereas permuting a CIFAR100 model using
min-cost matching achieves a test accuracy of 90.6%. Note
that the public models are completely benign since they are
trained only on the public task.
As a result, any threshold-based detector that determines
the existence of a TrojanNet for CIFAR10 when the test
accuracy is above 90% (equivalently, when the test error is
below L = 10%) is prone to false positives. Comparing
to Table 3, the pairwise training on (CIFAR10,CIFAR100)
using a TrojanNet achieves a test error of 8.16% – only
slightly below the test error achieved via min-cost matching.
We believe that this phenomenon is widespread across dif-
ferent datasets and suggests that selecting a tight threshold
L may be very difficult and may require an intricate balance
between computational efficiency and controlling the false
positive rate.
3.4. Analysis
We provide further analysis of the effect of weight sharing
through pseudo-random permutation by training a network
using multiple keys on the same task. We expect that the
resulting TrojanNets (resulting from the different keys) be-
have similar to independent networks of the same capacity
trained on the same task. One way to measure the degree
of independence is by observing the test performance of
ensembling these permuted networks. It is widely believed
that ensemble methods benefit from the diversity of its com-
ponent models (Krogh & Vedelsby, 1994), and the amount
of boost in ensemble performance can be used as a proxy
for measuring the degree of de-correlation between different
permuted models.
Benchmarks. We train TRN50 on CIFAR10/CIFAR100
with n keys for different values of K = 1, 2, 3, 5, 10 and
ensemble the resulting permuted networks for test-time pre-
diction. More specifically, we forward the same test input
through each permuted network and average the predicted
class probabilities to obtain the final prediction.
Our first benchmark to compare against is the ensemble of
K independently trained RN50 models, which serves as a
theoretical upper bound for the performance of the TRN50
ensemble. In addition, we compare to HashedNet (Chen
et al., 2015), a method of compressing neural networks, to
show similarity in ensemble performance when the compo-
nent networks have comparable capacity.
HashedNet applies a hash function to the model parameters
to reduce it to a much fewer number of bins. Parameters
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Figure 2. Test accuracy of TrojanResNet50 (TRN50), HashedResNet50 (HRN50) and ResNet50 (RN50) on CIFAR10 (left) and CIFAR100
(right). Individual models’ accuracy is represented by the darker portion of each bar, and the ensemble accuracy is shown in the lighter
shade. The error bars indicate standard deviation across different keys/models. Both the individual models’ accuracy and that of the
ensemble are close to identical between TRN50 and HRN50, which shows that the TRN50 networks are similar to independently trained
ones with similar capacity despite sharing the underlying parameters. Individual model accuracy of TRN50 and RN50 are almost identical
when n is small, and the gap only enlarges when n = 5, 10.
that fall into the same bin share the exact same value, and
the compression rate is equal to the ratio between the num-
ber of hash bins and total parameter size. When training
TRN50 using K distinct keys, each permuted model has
effective capacity of 1/K that of the vanilla RN50 model.
This capacity is identical to a compressed RN50 model us-
ing HashedNet with compression rate 1/K. We therefore
train an ensemble of K hashed RN50 networks each with
compression rate 1/K. We refer to the resulting compressed
HashedNet models as HashedResNet50 (HRN50).
Result comparison. Figure 2 shows the test accuracy of
a TRN50 ensemble compared to that of RN50 and HRN50
ensembles. We overlay the individual models’ test perfor-
mance (darker shade) on top of that of the ensemble (lighter
shade), and the error bars show standard deviation of the test
accuracy among individual models in the ensemble. From
this plot we can observe the following informative trends:
1. Individual TRN50 models (dark orange) have similar ac-
curacy to that of HRN50 models (dark blue) on both datasets.
This phenomenon can be observed across different values of
K. Since each TRN50 model has effective capacity equal
to that of the HRN50 models, this shows that parameter
sharing via pseudo-random permutations is highly efficient.
2. Ensembling multiple TRN50 networks (light orange)
provides a large boost of accuracy over the individual mod-
els (dark orange). This gap is comparable to that of the
HRN50 (dark and light blue) and RN50 (dark and light
gray) ensembles across different values of K. Since the
effect of ensemble is largely determined by the degree of
de-correlation between the component networks, this result
shows that training of TrojanNets results in models that are
as de-correlated as independent models.
3. The effect of ensembling TRN50 models is surpris-
ingly strong. Without an increase in model parameters,
the TRN50 ensemble (light orange) has comparable test
accuracy to that of the RN50 ensemble (light gray) when K
is small. For K = 5, 10, the TRN50 ensemble lags in com-
parison to the RN50 ensemble due to lower model capacity
of component networks. This result shows that TrojanNet
may be a viable method of boosting test-time performance
in memory-limited scenarios.
Effect of model capacity. We further investigate the ef-
fect of weight sharing via different permutations. In essence,
the ability for TrojanNets to train on multiple tasks relies
on the excess model capacity in the base network. It is intu-
itive to suspect that larger models can accommodate weight
sharing with more tasks. To test this hypothesis, we train a
TrojanResNet18 (TRN18) ensemble on CIFAR10 and CI-
FAR100 and measure the individual component models’
accuracy in comparison to training the base network.
Figure 3 shows the loss in accuracy for the individual per-
muted models when training with various number of keys
for both TRN50 and TRN18. The decrease in accuracy is
consistently lower for TRN50 (orange bar) than for TRN18
(brown bar), which shows that larger models have more
excess capacity to share among different permutations.
Another intriguing result is that TRN50 with as many as
10 different keys has relatively insignificant effect on the
individual models’ accuracy. The loss in accuracy is only
1.5% on CIFAR10 and 2.9% CIFAR100. This gap may
be further reduced for larger models. This suggest that
TrojanNets may be used in contexts apart from machine
learning security, as the sharing of excess model capacity is
exceptionally efficient and the resulting permuted models
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Figure 3. Decrease in test accuracy for TrojanNets when training with multiple keys on CIFAR10 (left) and CIFAR100 (right). Error
shows standard deviation across different keys. The reduction is zero when only one key is used. The larger TrojanResNet50 (TRN50)
model has consistently lower loss in accuracy than TrojanResNet18 (TRN18), which shows that having more excess capacity is beneficial
for training TrojanNets with a large number of keys. Also note that the permuted TRN50 models achieve an average test accuracy close to
that of training with one key.
exhibit high degrees of independence.
4. Related Work
Our work is within the context of machine learning security,
which studies the safety and privacy loopholes that a ma-
licious agent can exploit against a machine learned model.
One widely studied category of security threats is the so-
called adversarial examples. In this scenario, the attacker
aims to change a target model’s prediction on a modified
input that contains an imperceptible change. The attacker
cannot modify the network, but may access its parameters
(Szegedy et al., 2014; Madry et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner,
2017) or, in the minimal case, its predictions on chosen
queries (Chen et al., 2017; Brendel et al., 2017; Ilyas et al.,
2018). This attack has been successfully launched against
real world systems such as Google Voice (Cisse et al., 2017),
Clarifai (Liu et al., 2016) and Google Cloud Vision (Ilyas
et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2018; 2019).
Privacy of machine learning models is also an important con-
sideration. Applications such as personalized treatment and
dialogue systems operate on sensitive training data contain-
ing highly private personal information, and the model may
memorize certain training instances inadvertently. Shokri
et al. (2017) and Carlini et al. (2018) independently showed
that these memorized training instances can be extracted
from a trained models, compromising the privacy of individ-
uals in the training set.
The framework of differential privacy (Dwork, 2008) serves
as a tool to protect against privacy leakage. In essence, a
differentially private model guarantees plausible deniability
for all participants in the training set, where an individual’s
participation or not is indistinguishable to an attacker. Deep
neural networks can be trained privately by adding noise of
appropriate magnitude and distribution to the training loss
or gradient (Abadi et al., 2016; Mohassel & Zhang, 2017).
5. Discussion and Conclusion
We introduced TrojanNet, and formulate a potentially men-
acing attack scenario. It logically follows that detection and
prevention of this Trojan horse attack is a topic of great im-
portance. However, this may be a daunting task, as we show
theoretically that the detection problem can be formulated
as an NP-complete decision problem, and is therefore com-
putationally infeasible in its general form. While strategies
such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo have been used in simi-
lar contexts to efficiently reduce the search space (Diaconis,
2009), the number of candidate permutations may be too
large in our case. In fact, the number of permutations for a
single convolutional layer of ResNet50 can be upwards of
(64× 64× 3× 3)! ≈ 1.21× 10152336!
While our paper focuses on malicious uses of the Trojan-
Net framework, it can potentially be utilized for improving
the security of neural networks as well. Our framework
has striking resemblance to symmetric key encryption in
cryptography (Katz & Lindell, 2014). This enables the
sharing of neural networks across an insecure, monitored
communication channel in a similar fashion as steganog-
raphy (Petitcolas et al., 1999) – the hiding of structured
signals in files such as images, audio or text.
Another use of TrojanNet could be in watermarking neural
networks for copyright protection. Training a neural net-
work often requires significant data and resources, and a
corporation may wish to protect against the leakage of their
proprietary models via watermarking – a procedure that em-
beds a secret token into the network as proof of ownership
(Zhang et al., 2018). In this use case, knowledge of the
secret key used to extract the TrojanNet could serve as the
proof of ownership. We hope to explore such benevolent
TrojanNet: Embedding Hidden Trojan Horse Models in Neural Networks
uses of TrojanNet in future work.
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A. Appendix
A.1. NP-completeness proofs
In this section, we prove that the EXISTS-PERM decision problem is NP-complete. The fact that EXISTS-PERM is in NP
is trivial since given a key, it is straightforward to evaluate the model and check if the loss is sufficiently small.
Theorem 1. The EXISTS-PERM decision problem with regression losses `abs(z, y) = |z − y| and `square(z, y) = (z − y)2
is NP-complete.
Proof. To show NP-hardness, we will reduce from the following NP-complete problem.
1-IN-3SAT: Given a set of binary variables v1, . . . , vn ∈ 0, 1 and a set of logical clauses C = {C1 =
(l1,1 ∨ l1,2 ∨ l1,3), . . . , Cm = (lm,1 ∨ lm,2 ∨ lm,3}, does there exist an assignment of the xi’s such that each
clause has exactly one literal that evaluates to true?
Let C be an instance of the 1-IN-3SAT problem. We may assume WLOG that no clause in C contains a variable and its
negation. Let k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and consider a linear regression model h(x) = w>x with
w = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
,−1, . . . ,−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-k
).
For each Ci, define xi ∈ Rn so that
(xi)j =

1 if li,p = vj for some p,
−1 if li,p = ¬vj for some p,
0 otherwise
.
and let D = {(x1, y1 = −1), (x2, y2 = −1), . . . , (xm, ym = −1)}. We will show that 1-IN-3SAT admits a solution
v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ {0, 1}n with exactly k non-zero values if and only if 1m
∑m
i=1 `abs(σ(w
>xi), yi) < 2m . This gives a
polynomial-time reduction by testing for every k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. The proof is identical for the square loss `square.
Observe that for every i, the valuew>xi is an integer whose value is−1 only when exactly one of the literals inCi is satisfied.
If either none of or if more than one of the literals in Ci is satisfied thenw>xi ∈ {−3, 1, 3}. Thus `abs(w>xi, yi) = 0 if and
only if the clause Ci contains exactly one true literal. Summing over all the clauses gives that 1m
∑m
i=1 `abs(w
>xi, yi) = 0
if and only if all the clauses are satisfied. Since the values of w>xi ∈ {−3,−1, 1, 3}, at least one of the clauses Ci failing
to admit exactly one true literal is equivalent to the test loss 1m
∑m
i=1 `abs(w
>xi, yi) ≥ 2m . This completes the reduction by
setting L = 2m .
Theorem 2. The EXISTS-PERM decision problem with classification losses `binary(z, y) = 1z 6=y and `logistic(z, y) =
1/(1 + exp(yz)) is NP-complete.
Proof. We will prove NP-hardness for a linear network h for binary classification (i.e., logistic regression model). Our
reduction will utilize the following NP-complete problem.
CYCLIC-ORDERING: Given n ∈ N and a collection C = {(a1, b1, c1), . . . , (am, bm, cm)} of ordered triples, does there
exist a permutation pi : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} such that for every i = 1, . . . , n, we have either one of the following three
orderings:
(I) pi(ai) < pi(bi) < pi(ci),
(II) pi(bi) < pi(ci) < pi(ai), or
(III) pi(ci) < pi(ai) < pi(bi).
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We first show that the EXISTS-PERM problem with binary classification loss `binary is NP-hard. Given an instance
C = {(a1, b1, c1), . . . , (am, bm, cm)} of the CYCLIC-ORDERING problem, let w = (1, . . . , n) be the shared weights
vector and let pi ∈ Πn be a permutation. Let wpi = (wpi(1), . . . ,wpi(n)) be the weight vector after permuting by pi. Denote
by hpi the model obtained from wpi . For i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, 3, let xi,j be the all-zero vector except
(i) (xi,j)ai = −1 and (xi,j)bi = 1 if j = 1,
(ii) (xi,j)bi = −1 and (xi,j)ci = 1 if j = 2,
(iii) (xi,j)ci = −1 and (xi,j)ai = 1 if j = 3.
Let D = {(xi,j , yi,j = 1)}i=1,...,m,j=1,2,3 and let L = m+13m . For any permutation pi ∈ Πn, since hpi is a binary logistic
regression model, we have that hpi(xi,j) = 1 if and only if w>pi xi,j > 0. By construction, we have that for i = 1, . . . ,m,
`binary(hpi(xi,1), yi,1) = 0⇔ w>pi xi,1 > 0
⇔ (wpi)bi − (wpi)ai > 0
⇔ pi(ai) < pi(bi).
Similarly,
`binary(hpi(xi,2), yi,2) = 0⇔ pi(bi) < pi(ci),
`binary(hpi(xi,3), yi,3) = 0⇔ pi(ci) < pi(ai).
However, since at most one of conditions (I)-(III) can be satisfied, we have that at least one of pi(ai) < pi(bi), pi(bi) < pi(ci)
or pi(ci) < pi(ai) does not hold. Thus
1
3
3∑
j=1
`binary(hpi(xi,j), yi,j) ≥ 1
3
for all i. Furthermore, if 13
∑3
j=1 `binary(hpi(xi,j), yi,j) =
1
3 then one of (I)-(III) is satisfied. This shows that the cyclic
ordering defined by the ordered triple (ai, bi, ci) is satisfied if and only if 13
∑3
j=1 `binary(hpi(xi,j), yi,j) =
1
3 . Summing
over all i gives that the test loss
1
3m
m∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
`binary(hpi(xi,j), yi,j) =
1
3
if and only if one of conditions (I)-(III) is satisfied for every i. This shows that the CYCLIC-ORDERING problem instance
can be satisfied if and only if 13m
∑m
i=1
∑3
j=1 `binary(hpi(xi,j), yi,j) <
m+1
3m = L. This completes the reduction for `binary.
For `logistic, fix  ∈ (0, 1m ) and choose z ≥ 0 so that `logistic(z) = . Recall that the logistic loss is strictly decreasing,
anti-symmetric around 0, and bijective between R and (0, 1). Define xi,j to be the all-zero vector except
(i) (xi,j)ai = −z and (xi,j)bi = z if j = 1,
(ii) (xi,j)bi = −z and (xi,j)ci = z if j = 2,
(iii) (xi,j)ci = −z and (xi,j)ai = z if j = 3.
Following a similar argument, we have that for every i = 1, . . . ,m:
`logistic(hpi(xi,1), yi,1) =
{
 if pi(ai) < pi(bi),
1−  otherwise,
and similarly for `logistic(hpi(xi,2), yi,2) and `logistic(hpi(xi,3), yi,3). Hence
1
3
3∑
j=1
`logistic(hpi(xi,j), yi,j) =
{
1+
3 if one of (I)-(III) is satisfied,
2−
3 otherwise.
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Summing over all i gives that
1
3m
m∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
`logistic(hpi(xi,j), yi,j) =
1 + 
3
<
m+ 1
3m
if the CYCLIC-ORDERING problem is satisfied, and
1
3m
m∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
`logistic(hpi(xi,j), yi,j) ≥ m− 1
m
(
1 + 
3
)
+
1
m
(
2− 
3
)
≥ m+ 1
3m
if at least one triple in C is violated. This completes the reduction by setting L = m+13m .
